Here's a law review article I wrote on Florida's Conditional release

[SteveBaer]

The Conditional Release Program Act -
Overview and Relief from Improper Application
2011
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Steven Baer

I. INTRODUCTION

The Conditional Release Program Act (“CRPA”) was enacted in 1988 due to concerns about the early and unsupervised release from prison of repeat and sexual offenders. The Act provides that upon reaching the tentative release date (maximum release date minus gain time credit), an inmate who meets certain criteria will be released under supervision by the Florida Parole Commission (“FPC”). Since its enactment, the FPC and the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”) have tried to widen its scope to include persons not intended for supervision by the Legislature. This article will clarify who does, and more importantly, who does not qualify under the Act, and the proper legal actions to take if CRPA is being wrongly imposed.

II. STATUTES AND CONTEXT

The Statute, F.S §947.1405 (2008), provides the following:
(2) Any inmate who: (a) Is convicted of a crime committed on or after October 1, 1988, and before January 1, 1994,and any inmate who is convicted of a crime committed on or after January 1, 1994, which crime is or was contained in Category 1, Category 2, Category 3, or Category 4 of Rule 3.701 and Rule 3.988, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993),and who has served at least one prior felony commitment at a state or federal correctional institution; (b) Is sentenced as a habitual or violent habitual offender or a violent career criminal pursuant to §775.084; or (c) Is found to be a sexual predator under §775.21 or former §775.23, shall, upon reaching the tentative date or provisional release date, whichever is earlier, as established by the Department of Corrections, be released under supervision subject to specified terms and conditions…
The reference to January 1, 1994, in regard to the statute, just involved some minor wording changes that did not include substantive rights.[1] The statute was amended in 2005[2] to add electronic monitoring and new provisions for several offenses. In 2008, a releasee found to have committed a crime for the benefit of a gang, will have a condition that he may not associate with other gang members.[3] Since its enactment in 1988, it has remained substantially the same, except for the addition of sexual offenders and predators to its scope.[4]
The current offenses that qualify a releasee for supervision are murder and manslaughter, sexual offenses, robbery, and violent personal crimes.[5] Excluded are the offenses of burglary, theft, forgery, fraud, drugs, weapons, escape, and all other offenses.[6] A prisoner must have one of the offenses listed in Rule 3.701 and 3.988(1)-(4), plus a prior felony commitment to qualify for supervision. This is where the courts have had to interpret the statute most often.
The decision to apply is made as provided in F.S. §947.1405(5): Within180 days prior to the tentative release date or provisional release date, whichever is earlier, a representative of the department shall review the inmate’s program participation, disciplinary record, psychological and medical records, criminal records, and any other information pertinent to the impending release. The department shall gather and compile information necessary for the Commission to make the determinations set forth in subsection (3). A department representative shall conduct a personal interview with the inmate for the purpose of determining the details of the inmate’s release plan, including the inmate’s planned residence and employment. The department representative shall forward the inmate’s release plan to the Commission and recommend to the Commission the terms and conditions of the conditional release.
The FDOC has a ministerial function and does not make the decision as to who will be placed on conditional release. The FPC, however, has the duty to interpret and impose under F.S. §947.405(6):
The Commission shall review the recommendations of the Department, and such other information as it deems relevant, and may conduct a review of the inmate’s record for the purpose of establishing the terms and conditions of the conditional release… If the Commission determines that the inmate is eligible for release under this section, the Commission shall enter an order establishing the length of supervision and the conditions attendant thereto…The length of supervision must not exceed the maximum penalty imposed by the court.
Violations of conditional release are governed by F.S. §947.141. They provide for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of a violator, the resulting disposition, and effect on the person’s sentence. For inmates whose offenses were committed on or after July 1, 1995, detention may be served in a county jail not to exceed 22 months.[7]

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RELEASEE

For an inmate just being released from prison, the burden of conditional release supervision is high. As the First District explained, “defendant’s conditional release, as an extra post-prison, probation-type program, was not a benefit, but an additional burden to him”.[8]
Both the FDOC and the FPC are involved in determining the conditions of release.[9] These commonly include curfew, drug testing, steady employment, and random searches on less than probable cause. They may also include crime-specific conditions such as no contact with the victim or certain areas or people. Violations of said conditions may result (for sexual offenders, who face added restrictions, it must result) in the issuance of a warrant for the releasee’s arrest. The issuance of the arrest warrant can be on “reasonable grounds”, less than probable cause.[10]
The offender must then be detained without bond until there is a judicial determination of probable cause. If the magistrate determines that there was probable cause for the arrest, such determination also constitutes reasonable grounds to believe that the offender violated the conditions of the release.[11] Within 72 hours of such determination (excluding weekends and holidays), the Commission must make a final decision on whether to issue a warrant.
The FPC then has 45 days to have a hearing with a commissioner and the inmate. Fact finding is done by the commissioner after the hearing, and a panel of no fewer than two commissioners enters the final order. The inmate whose offense occurred on or after July 1, 1995 may be detained at a local jail for up to 22 months, while inmates whose crime occurred before this are returned to prison.[12]
The inmate may be restored to supervision or returned to prison. If returned to prison, the inmate loses all gain time and continues serving the unfinished portion of his sentence.[13] Several cases have held that the FPC has broad authority to either grant or deny credit for time spent on conditional release[14], but in practice they do not give credit for time spent in the community.
If an inmate has received a term of probation or community control supervision to be served after release from incarceration, the period of probation or community control must be substituted for the conditional release supervision.[15] The conditional release will resume after the period of court ordered supervision ends, if there is any time remaining. They run concurrently.
The burden imposed by the Conditional Release Program Act is substantial. Not only must the releasee learn to adapt to the outside world, he must also not make any mistakes (some technical violations are extremely minor), or else he faces re-imprisonment. In addition to being sent back to prison, his gain time would be forfeited and he would have to serve the remaining months or years. During this time, he still earns gain time, which will once again subject him to conditional release.[16] This cycle of freedom under conditions and re-imprisonment, is why many FDOC inmates choose to get disciplinary reports and forfeit their earned gain time. This creates a false system under which inmates are punished for good behavior in earning credits that are the only compensation for work and good behavior for most inmates.
The author is in favor of the repeal of the Conditional Release Program Act. Inmates who fall under its purview are not ordered by the sentencing court to serve extra post-imprisonment time on probation or other form of supervision. Most inmates coming into the system are unaware of the Act, and it is not raised in court, so that a defendant could make a knowing and intelligent plea. Despite this, the courts have ruled that a defendant is not entitled to notice prior to pleas.[17]
The statute was enacted in reaction to high recidivism rates present in Florida, but also across the country. At some point the State has to let go, and earned gain time for work, good behavior, and program participation is a good example. The average FDOC inmate receives no pay for his work, only these credits. To then subject the inmate to the provisions of the Act violates the concepts of fundamental fairness and reward for good conduct.

IV. CASES THAT DEFINE THE LIMITS

The cases that have arisen clarify the limits of the CRPA, and where the powers lie. In Gray v. State,[18] the court held that the FPC is the agency charged with responsibility for interpreting the governing statute.
Jongewaard v. State [19] noted that a person twice committed on the same offense had not served time for one prior felony. Thus, a violation of probation cannot subject one to supervision, because it does not count as another separate charge.[20]
Sentences not subject to conditional release remain distinct from sentences that are, and release dates must be calculated only from covered offenses.[21] However, it was held in Wesley v. State,[22] that conditional release could be tolled from a qualifying sentence, until the defendant was released from prison on a second sentence. But see David v. Meadows,[23] holding that an inmate should be permitted to complete his sentence while civilly committed; and Bolden v. Florida Dept. of Corrections,[24] holding that DOC should not have tolled the conditional release supervision for offenses resulting from the same criminal episode. In Evans v. Singletary, supra, the Florida Supreme Court explained that allowing offenders to serve their conditional release in prison would be impractical, and that tolling the supervision until the inmate is released is the most logical choice.
Inmates with concurrent felony commitments, where part of one or more sentence is mandatory, should argue that they be given the benefit of Bolden v. Florida Dept. of Corrections,[25] especially if the issue can be raised in the First District. This will prevent the sentence which expires first from being tolled until the completion of the remaining sentences. It is possible that such tolling would increase supervision beyond the maximum sentence,[26] a good issue to be raised on habeas corpus.
Gove v. Florida Parole Com’n [27] is the defining case for the “prior felony commitment” clause. The FPC itself tried to argue that the statute was ambiguous, but this was to its detriment in Gove. Gove had two concurrent felony commitments, the longer of which was a covered offense under Category (3) of Rule 3.988.[28] The FPC tried to apply conditional release to Gove under the argument that concurrent commitments can qualify as a “prior felony commitment”[29] (Gove also had an escape while in prison but was not charged with this crime). The court found that “it is undisputed that Gove had not served a prior felony commitment”.[30] The opinion stated:
This construction of the statute is consistent with the Commission’s own Rule 23-23.006 (11), F.A.C., which defines prior felony commitment as follows:
(11) Prior felony commitment- means an offense or offenses which resulted in an adjudication of guilt of a felony and a sentence of incarceration. Both the consummation of the criminal offense[s] and the subsequent conviction[s] and incarceration[s] must obtain at some date earlier in time than the offenses resulting in commitment to incarceration for the present offense of conviction.[31]
The FPC seems to have recognized the ambiguity of the term “prior felony commitment” before Gove, and foreclosed it with their administrative rule which was very specific. Prisoners with concurrent sentences and no prior felonies should make special note of F.A.C.[32] Rule 23-23.006(11). The end of the Gove decision stated:
While the Parole Commission argues that it is in the process of changing this rule, the current rule is consistent with the Statute, presumptively valid, and will be accorded due consideration by this court. See City of Palm Bay v. State Dept. of Transp., 588 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding a duly promulgated administrative rule is presumptively valid until invalidated in a section 120.56 rule challenge).[33]
The FPC did amend this rule, and the amendment took effect May 29, 2002. The rule[34] now reads:
(11)(a) Felony Commitment – means the incarceration portion of a prison sentence for a felony offense resulting from a Uniform Commitment to Custody of the Department of the Department of Corrections or the incarceration portion of a prison sentence for a felony offense served in any other state or federal correctional institution.
(b) Prior Felony Commitment – means any felony commitment served prior to a subsequent felony commitment even though both may have resulted from the same criminal offense.
The 2002 amendment leaves the rule more open and vague. However, administrative changes and amendments may not be used to clarify legislative intent ten years after the original enactment,[35] or in this case twelve years as the original statute was promulgated in 1988. Applicability of CRPA to repeat offenders only is again emphasized in Mayes v. Moore.[36]
Once conditional release is properly applied, the FPC has the discretionary authority to impose “any special conditions it considers warranted” from the record.[37] This is a quasi-judicial action, so a challenge to any condition that is especially outrageous would be made by petition for certiorari to the District Court of Appeal.[38] The violation must be willful and supported by substantial evidence in the record.[39] The finding of the FPC is subject to certiorari review, which centers on whether due process was provided, and the result supported by competent evidence.[40]
V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Of relevance to the Conditional Release Program statute is the common-law rule of lenity. This rule requires criminal statutes to be given a construction favorable to the accused when there is ambiguity. It is codified in F.S. §775.021(1) and (2)(2008):
(1) The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused. (2) The provisions of this chapter are applicable to offenses defined by other statutes, unless the code otherwise provides.
In Florida Parole Commission v. Cooper,[41] the court found, “even if we were to find the statute ambiguous, we would have to construe the statute in the manner most favorable to the inmate”. If there is a reasonable construction of a penal statute favorable to the accused, the court must employ that construction.[42] This arises from the due process requirement that criminal statutes must apprise ordinary persons of common intelligence what is prohibited.[43]
VI. AVENUES OF RELIEF
For the inmate or releasee who finds himself unlawfully subjected to the Conditional Release Program Act, there are several remedies at law and equity.[44] The proper action depends on the circumstances of the case and whether the harm is upcoming or immediate.[45] Likewise, the proper writ is determined by whether the agency’s decision was discretionary and quasi-judicial, or mandatory and ministerial.[46]
The inmate does not waive his right to object, because they are not a judicial order, by signing conditional release papers before he leaves prison.[47] Thus, if the inmate is threatened with a disciplinary report for refusing to sign, he should comply with institutional staff and then challenge it in court.
Review of a parole commission order is available by mandamus or habeas corpus.[48] If an inmate is not claiming the right to immediate release, a petition for writ of mandamus is the proper remedy.[49] Such petitions have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(c) and (c)(1)(c), pertaining to administrative action. Mandamus is an equitable remedy and is governed by equitable principles.[50] Although the distinction between law and equity is not as pronounced today, equitable relief is not spelled out by statute, and consists of orders commanding acts to be done or prohibiting their commission.
In general, the writ will issue on three essential elements: a clear right in plaintiff to relief sought; a clear legal duty on defendant’s part to do the act at issue; and the absence of adequate alternative remedy.[51] It may not be used to establish a new legal right – for instance, to find that a law violates due process.[52] It is available upon a “straightforward question of law” which does not involve fact finding.[53]
Although a writ of mandamus cannot be used to compel a public agency to exercise its discretionary powers in a given manner, it may be used to compel the agency to follow its own rules.[54]
A writ of mandamus will not lie where an inmate seeks enforcement of a privilege,[55] not a clearly established right by statute, code, or common law. It requires exhaustion of such administrative remedies as are available, and having no adequate legal remedy, such as appeal.[56] Where administrative remedies are not available, a plaintiff must first make an express, distinct demand for performance to a judge or public official.[57] Unfortunately, courts are often required to dismiss such actions because of intervening events, or because a court is about to proceed in excess of its jurisdiction.[58]
The practice of using mandamus to challenge Parole Commission[59] orders or prison disciplinary proceedings[60] extends well beyond the traditional function of mandamus, and is more akin to a plenary appeal on the merits than a petition for extraordinary relief. When challenging FPC orders, the circuit court will determine: “(1) whether procedural due process was accorded; (2) whether the essential requirements of law were observed; and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence.[61] Prison disciplinary hearings face the added obstacle that they need only be supported by “some evidence”, and not by “competent substantial evidence”, in the record.[62] Parole Commission challenges have the more favorable standard.[63]
Habeas corpus review can also be used to inquire into the legality of the detention[64] when an inmate has been released to supervision. This is the speediest form of relief, available only to those seeking immediate release from confinement.[65] Formal service of process is not required in petitions for mandamus or habeas corpus.[66] Instead, the judge reviews the pleading for sufficiency, and issues an order to show cause upon defendant. Exhaustion of remedies is required in habeas corpus as well, even if a person remains illegally detained beyond his lawful date. State habeas relief must be applied for first – federal courts will not consider such petitions until all issues therein have been first presented to a state court.[67]
Although the scope of its review is limited, the District Court of Appeal will review by certiorari denial of mandamus or habeas corpus. This review consists of whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law.[68] It is a “second-tier” certiorari review, and the standard for reversal is not mere legal error, but whether the “circuit court…violated a clearly established principle of law resulting in a gross miscarriage of justice”.[69] This is so because the first level of review was a plenary appeal on the merits.[70]
For a challenge to a quasi-judicial decision (that is, one in which the agency is empowered to use discretion in making), a plaintiff will need to petition for a writ of certiorari in the appropriate District Court of Appeal.[71] The only time this will become applicable in the context of these issues, is when the FPC finds after a hearing that the inmate violated his conditional release.[72] For orders of the FDOC and FPC unlawfully subjecting an inmate to release, the proper remedy is mandamus or habeas corpus.[73] If the FDOC is improperly calculating the inmate’s sentence, as opposed to the court, a petition for mandamus should be applied for.[74]
Injunction and declaratory judgment are other civil remedies that have not been discussed, due to their unsuitability to relief from the statute, generally. Injunction will lie to restrain enforcement of the law,[75] but the Parole Commission enters an order within the last six months of an inmate’s sentence, which is challengeable by mandamus. Declaratory judgment[76] seeks to explain rights or obligations through a court’s determination of a legal issue, and is binding.
An inmate will likely first be told that he will have conditional release by his classification officer. Many times, this determination will be wrong. He should then write the FPC for a determination.[77] Upon doing so, the author was correctly informed that he would not be subject to the Act upon his release.
Petitions must be filed in the county of principal headquarters of the agency.[78] This means you must file in the Leon County Circuit Court,[79] and if necessary, seek review in the First District Court of Appeal.[80] A courteous letter to the Parole Commission will likely save a person the trouble. They are more familiar with the law than the Department of Corrections is. The FPC usually responds within two weeks.
The FPC has judicial immunity and cannot be sued for miscalculating and imposing an incorrect release from supervision date,[81] under an action for negligence. The FDOC is not statutorily charged with imposing the Act, so it is also not liable.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Conditional Release Program Act was the result of a legislative push to “do something” about violent crime and recidivism. Unfortunately, it actually serves to impede the transition back to the community, and frequently results in re-incarceration for technical offenses.[82] These offenses would not have resulted in the person returning to prison had the Act not been in place, filling up prison beds and again throwing the releasee’s life in turmoil. For most FDOC inmates, the realization that they will have a post-prison supervision period comes at some point during their sentence. Yet due to a fiction of law that makes gain time a legally mandated substitute for in-custody time, courts have ruled that the Act is constitutional, and that defendants do not have to be made aware of it before they plead guilty. It is no cure for the societal ills it seeks to alleviate, and it is actually worse than the disease. The author is in favor of its repeal, and for inmates to have their gain time free from supervision.
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This material may be freely reproduced with credit given to the author.




[1] Laws 1993, c1993-417, §4 (eff. Nov. 24, 1993).

[2] Laws 2005, c. 2005-28, §12; 2005-67, §2 (eff. Jan. 1, 2006).

[3] Laws 2008, c. 2008-238, §23 (eff. October 1, 2008).

[4] Laws 1995, c. 1995-283, §57 (eff. June 15, 1995).

[5] Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.988(1)-(4)(2008).

[6] Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.988(5)-(9)(2008).

[7] Laws 1995, c.1995-283, §40 (eff. June 15, 1995).

[8] Gove v. Florida Parole Com’n, 816 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), reh. den.

[9] F.S. §947.1405(5),(6).

[10] F.S. §947.141.

[11] F.S.§947.141(2).

[12] F.S. §947.141(4).

[13] F.S. §947.141(6).

[14] Rivera v. Singletary, 707 So.2d 326 (Fla.1998).

[15] F.S. §947.1405(2)(c).

[16] Bolden v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 865 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), reh. gr., rev. gr. 848 So.2d 1153, rev.dis. 867 So.2d 373.

[17] Mayes v. Moore, 827 So.2d 967 (Fla. 2002), cert. den. 539 U.S. 904, 123 S.Ct. 2245, 156 L.Ed. 2d 114. This is because of a legal fiction that CRPA is a legally-mandated substitute for sentenced, in-custody time, unlike probation, which is part of a sentence. Dwyer v. State, 981 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

[18] Gray v. State, 791 So.2d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

[19] Jongewaard v. State, 824 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

[20] Mosley v. State, 820 So.2d 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

[21] Parole Com’n v. Cooper, 701 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1997), reh. den.

[22] Wesley v. State, 848 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2003).

[23] David v. Meadows, 881 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

[24] Supra. It is worth examining the lengthy dissent in Bolden contending the decision is incompatible with Evans v. Singletary, 737 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1999).

[25] Supra.

[26] See dissent in Bolden, 867 So.2d 373 (Fla. 2003).

[27] Gove v. Florida Parole Com’n, 816 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

[28] Fla. R. Crim. P.

[29] F.S. §947.1405(2)(a)(2008).

[30] Gove v. Florida Parole Com’n, supra.

[31] Supra.

[32] Florida Administrative Code.

[33] Gove v. Florida Parole Com’n, supra.

[34] F.A.C. 23-23.006(2007).

[35] State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lafont, 658 So.2d 55 (jFla. 1995).

[36] Supra.

[37] F.S. §947.1405(6),(7); Grace v. Florida Parole Com’n, 985 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

[38] Adams Packing Assn. Inc. v. Fl. Dept. of Citrus, 352 So.2d 569 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977).

[39] Ellis v. Florida Parole Com’n, 911 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

[40] See Part VI, infra.

[41] Florida Parole Com’n v. Cooper, supra.

[42] Wallace v. State, 860 So.2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

[43] State v. Ragland, 789 So.2d 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Love v. State, 886 So.2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), rev. den. 939 So.2d 1059.

[44] Injunction is a primary form of equitable relief.

[45] Mobrey v. Florida Parole Com’n, 858 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2003).

[46] Adams Packing Assn. v. Fl. Dept. of Citrus, supra; State ex. rel. Zucherman-Vernon Corp. v. City of Miramar, 306 So.2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)(explaining discretionary/ministerial duty).

[47] Gove v. Florida Parole Com’n, supra.

[48] Mobrey, supra; Sheley v. Fla. Parole Com’n, 703 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), approved, 720 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1998).

[49] Mathis v. Singletary, 608 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

[50] Touchton v. City of Fort Pierce, 109 F. 2d 370 (5th Cir. 1940); principles of equity are given by the common law.

[51] Linde Homecare Medical Systems, Inc. v. Harris, 479 F. supp 1033 (M.D. Fla. 1979).

[52] State ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1961).

[53] Fine v. Firestone, 443 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

[54] Rivera v. Moore, 825 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla. 2003)(that the statute may need to be examined and interpreted does not make the right any more or less clear for mandamus purposes).

[55] Claudio v. Shoar, 917 So.2d 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)(work release participation as established by F.S. §951.24(2)(c) was a privilege for inmates).

[56] Kirsch v. Greadington, 425 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

[57] Medberry v. Circuit Court for Brevard County, 762 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

[58] Wincor v. Turner, 215 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1968).

[59] Sheley v. Florida Parole Com’n, supra.

[60] Holcomb v. Dept. of Corrections, 609 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

[61] Plymel v. Moore, 770 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), quoting Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995).

[62] Superindendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed. 356 (1985).

[63] Ellis v. Florida Parole Com’n, supra.

[64] “Detention” also includes probation, parole, or bail. Duvallon v. Florida, 691 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. den. 460 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 1533, 75 L.Ed. 2d 953. 28 U.S.C.A. §2254 (federal habeas corpus statute).

[65] Schack v. State, 194 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967), cert. den. 200 So.2d 814, cert. den. 386 U.S. 1027, 87 S.Ct. 1387, 10 L.Ed. 2d 469.

[66] Crane v. Hayes, 253 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1971).

[67] Hargrett v. Wainwright, 474 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1973).

[68] Sheley v. Fla. Parole Com’n, supra; Hayes v. David, 875 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

[69] Hartley v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 939 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

[70] Cherokee Crushed Stone v. City of Miramar, 421 So.2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

[71] Anoll v. Pomerance, 363 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1978); State ex rel. Zucherman-Vernon Corp. v. City of Miramar, supra (holding that an act is ministerial when the law prescribes and defines it with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment).

[72] Ellis v. Florida Parole Com’n, supra.

[73] Mobrey v. Florida Parole Com’n, supra.

[74] If the court has wrongly calculated the sentence, relief is by way of a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800 (a) Motion. See Wesley v. State, supra.

[75] City of Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Worley, 44 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1950); Johnson v. McNeil, 10 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1942); (“At all times, courts are open to the citizen and taxpayer to seek relief against the arbitrary action of government agencies”).

[76] F.S. §86.011, et seq.; X Corp. v. Y Person, 622 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1993).

[77] Florida Parole Commission, 4070 Esplanade Way, Tallahassee, FL 32399-2450 (updated June 11, 2011)

[78] Revell v. Paschal, 564 So.2d 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); except for habeas petitions, which are filed in the county of unlawful detainment.

[79] Leon County Clerk of Court (2nd Circuit), P.O. Box 726, Tallahassee, FL 32302.

[80] First District Court of Appeal, 301 Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd., Tallahassee, FL 32399-1850.

[81] Andrews v. Florida Parole Com’n, 768 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 2000), review granted 789 So.2d 343, review dismissed as improvidently granted 791 So.2d 1093.

[82] Such as being 5 minutes late getting home, losing a job, or a positive result on a drug test.